We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity-or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximising industry profits, finding that it is larger in the Cournot case. While industry structure is always inefficient under Bertrand behaviour, it may or may not be so under Cournot behaviour, depending on parameter values. The comparison of private industry optima reveals that the Cournot steady state welfare level exceeds the corresponding Bertrand magnitude if the weight of the stock of pollution is large enough.
Introduction
The usual approach to the economics of the environment treats externalities and the extraction of natural re sources separately, and in the latter case compares open access (or equivalently, perfect competition) against monopoly.¹ Here we propose a unified approach to the two aspects of the industrial exploitation of the envi ronment, using a homogeneous good oligopoly in which firms may set either quantities or prices to maximise profits, and their productive activities require the use of a renewable resource and emit pollutants. Each of these two aspects has indeed received attention in the literature, either in static or in dynamic oligopoly mod els, but, to the best of our knowledge, the joint analysis of resource extraction and pollution has not.² Our anal ysis will abstract from the possibility of regulating firms' interaction via Pigouvian taxation/subsidization³ and/or pollution rights,⁴ to focus on the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons. This problem lies at the intersection between the well known discussion about the tragedy of the commons [15, 16] and the standard approach to the entry process belonging to the theory of industrial organization [17, 18, 19] . The back bone of this discussion is the fact that, while in absence of any external effects increasing competition (and therefore industry output) increases welfare, if industrial activities exploit natural resources and/or imply the emission of pollutants then the socially optimal degree of concentration of such an industry is determined by the balance between the price effect and the environmental one [20, 21, 22, 23] . We revisit this issue in a differ ential game in which we assess the privately optimal structure (maximising industry profits) against the so cially optimal industry structure (maximising social welfare), given the profit-maximising behaviour of firms, under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Industry structure is always socially inefficient under Bertrand behaviour, while it may or may not be so under Cournot behaviour, depending on the environment's efficiency in absorbing pollution. Then, we establish that (i) the privately optimal structure in Cournot exceeds its coun terpart in Bertrand, and consequently (ii) social welfare in the private optimum can be higher at the Bertrand equilibrium, if the weight of pollution in the social welfare function is sufficiently high.
The basic model is laid out in Section 2. The equilibrium under Cournot competition is outlined in Sec tion 3. Section 4 contains the analysis under Bertrand competition. The optimal number of firms in the com mons is assessed in Section 5, while a comparison between a Cournot and Bertrand regime is investigated in Section 6. Concluding remarks are in Section 7.
The setup
Consider an oligopoly market over an infinite (continuous) time horizon, ∈ [0, ∞), in which ≥ 2 firms supply a homogeneous good, whose market demand function is
at any time ∈ [0, ∞), with > 0 being a positive constant parameter measuring the reservation price and ( ) = ∑ =1 ( ) being the sum of all firms' output levels. Production takes place at decreasing returns to scale, with the same technology being common to all firms alike, so that firm 's instantaneous cost function is ( ) = 2 ( ), with the constant > 0.⁵ The production of the final output goes along with a negative environmental externality whose instantaneous level is ( ) = 2 ( )/2, with > 0 and ( ) evolving over time according to the following dynamics:
where > 0 is the decay rate of the stock and is a positive constant. The instantaneous consumer surplus CS( ) is measured by the area below the demand function and above market price ( ), minus the externality ( ):
It is worth noting that a contraction of output has ambiguous consequences over consumer surplus, due to the presence of a negative externality proportional to the output: on the one hand, shrinking output goes along with increasing market price, which is harmful; on the other hand, it entails reducing the environmental externality, which is desirable. The balance between these components will play a key role in the remainder of the analysis. Additionally, the production of the final good makes use of a renewable natural resource whose stock ( ) follows the state equation:
where and are strictly positive constants. The instantaneous social welfare function, defined as the sum of industry profits and consumer surplus, writes as follows:
where ( ) = [ ( ) − ] ( ) is firm 's instantaneous profit function. 5 We could have specified the cost function as ( ) = ( ) + 2 ( ), with > 0. This would be a useless complication, however, as one could as well think of the vertical intercept of the demand function as =̂− , whereby the ensuing analysis would reproduce unmodified.
In the remainder of the paper, we investigate the non-cooperative unregulated open-loop game where firms compete either à la Cournot-Nash or à la Bertrand, alternatively, to maximise individual profits. In both cases, firm chooses its strategy (either quantity or price) to maximise the discounted individual profit flow:
s.t. the state equations (2) and (4), and the initial conditions (0) = 0 and (0) = 0 . Parameter > 0 represents the constant discount rate common to all firms in the industry.
The Cournot-Nash game
Here we characterise the open-loop equilibrium of the first game, where all firms are private and compete à la Cournot-Nash to maximise individual profits. Our first objective is to prove the following claim:
Proposition 1. The game among profit-maximising firms is a linear state one, and therefore its open-loop Cournot-Nash solution is strongly time consistent.
Proof. The current value Hamiltonian of firm is:
where ( ) and ( ) are the co-state variables associated with the dynamics of pollution and the natural resource, respectively. The following system illustrates the set of first order conditions on controls and the associated co-state equations (omitting henceforth the time argument for brevity):
where
is the amount of instantaneous output collectively supplied by all rivals of firm at any given time. Clearly, (8-10) jointly imply that the optimal output of firm never depends on the states. The intuitive reason is that firms -being unregulated profit maximising entities -are completely uninterested in the amount of pollution and the stock of the resource and consequently behave as if the two-sided tragedy of commons did not exist. From a strictly technical standpoint, one can easily check that
and therefore the game is indeed a linear state one (cf. [24, p. 188]), yielding a subgame perfect or strongly time consistent Nash equilibrium under the open-loop information structure.
Accordingly, from (10) one obtains = 0 for all = 1, . . . , at any time during the game. Plugging it into (8), differentiating w.r.t. time, imposing symmetry across quantities ( = = for all , ) and using (9), the control equation obtains:̇=
Imposing stationarity, we have CN = /( + 1 + 2 ), which coincides with the solution of the static game.
Superscript CN stands for Cournot-Nash. Of course the same solution obtains immediately by observing that the system of co-state equations (9-10) admits the solution = = 0 for all = 1, . . . , at all times, whereby the first order condition (8) indeed delivers CN = /( + 1 + 2 ) throughout the game.⁶ Before proceeding any further, we briefly evaluate the stability properties of the dynamic system (2-4-12) , by looking at the associated Jacobian matrix:
whose eigenvalues are
Accordingly, we can state:
Proposition 2. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the open-loop game is a saddle point.
The corresponding amount of pollution and the residual volume of natural resource obtain, respectively, froṁ= 0 anḋ= 0:⁷
From the above expressions we can draw: The per-firm profits and social welfare in steady state are
The above expression reveals the following result. 6 This also implies that = 0 for all throughout the game, as is easily verified from (9). Thus, the transversality conditions
are trivially satisfied for all . 7 Then, one can also easily show that the feedback equilibrium based upon the linear value function ( , ) = 1 + 2 + 3 and the corresponding Bellman equation
That is, if the rate of absorption of pollutants is high enough, then social welfare cannot fall below zero. The critical threshold highlighted in Lemma 4 is clearly increasing in both and , i.e., the parameters mea suring the marginal contribution of industry output to the accumulation of pollution, and the weight of the stock of pollutants in the composition of welfare.
The Bertrand-Nash game
Here we deal with the price competition case. The Hamiltonian of firm is defined as in (7), and as usual prof it-seeking firms do not internalise the external effects of their strategies. Hence, also in the Bertrand case the open-loop equilibrium will be strongly time consistent, and will replicate forever the equilibrium of the static one-shot game. There remains to characterise the equilibrium price behaviour of firms at the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. To perform this task, we will rely on [25] , that has established what follows.
According to [25] , if the cost function (common to all firms) features decreasing returns to scale, as is the case in the present model, then the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In particular, the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is characterised by both firms setting the same price BN , which is bounded by two thresholds, avc ≤ BN ≤ . The lower bound avc (as the superscript indicates) equals average variable costs, so that at avc firms will be indifferent between either producing the output solving
or producing nothing at all. The upper bound (with superscript u standing for undercutting) is the price at which firms are indifferent between choosing price , and marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire market demand at . The value of avc is given by solving (19) w.r.t. :
which delivers = /( + ) and then substituting the latter into the demand function to obtain:
The upper bound to the equilibrium price, , obtains by imposing indifference between the symmetric oligopoly profits:
and the monopoly profits generated by undercutting:
Imposing = we obtain the following:
which can be plugged into the demand function to identify = ( + 1) ( + 1) + .
As a matter of curiosity, one can equate the inverse demand function to marginal cost, then solve for and finally substitute the resulting output back into the demand function, to obtain marginal cost pricing:
where, obviously, superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing.
The continuum of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following expression:
Parameter represents the relative intensity of price competition between firms. Note that, when = 0, the equilibrium price BN equals average variable cost; = 1 corresponds to the case in which price equals marginal cost, while at = 4/3 the price attains the highest level above which undercutting takes place. As a consequence, we impose the restriction ∈ [0, 4/3]. Using (27), the individual output and profits write, respectively, as follows:
Using (28), we can solvė= 0 anḋ= 0 to obtain the steady state levels of pollution and the natural resource:
It is worth noting that the limits of BN and BN coincide with those of the corresponding magnitudes gener ated by Cournot behaviour.⁸ The associated level of social welfare is:
The above expression immediately shows the following:
the steady state social welfare level of the Bertrand game is positive.
A comparison between the above thresholds points out that
which holds for all ≥ 2 and > 0, hence the threshold emerging from the Cournot game is lower than the one characterising the Bertrand setting.
The second-best industry structure
Here we focus on the issue of the optimal number of firms in the commons. We set out by checking that the industry structure maximising industry profits in the steady state of the Cournot model solves 
for all
and the r.h.s. of (35) may be evaluated against the threshold CN appearing in Lemma 4 at = CN = 1 + 2 :
Therefore we can formulate:
In the alternative range <, we have CN < CN and consequently
Now we turn our attention to the Bertrand case. Here, the number of firms that maximises industry profits BN solves
for all ∈ [0, 4/3]. Under this condition (that excludes the trivial monopoly case and ensures ≥ 2 irrespective of the market variable being set), we can substitute BN into the derivative of BN w.r.t. , finding 
Since Lemma 5 establishes that > BN = √ in order for BN > 0, we can state:
We may sum up this discussion in the following terms. Provided is large enough to ensure that social welfare is positive at the steady state of both games, Propositions 6 and 7 jointly convey a message telling that, while under quantity-setting behaviour the privately optimal number of firms may be higher or lower than the socially optimal one, depending on market size and the environment's efficiency in absorbing pol lution, under price-setting behaviour we have the unambiguous result that a benevolent planner would like to enlarge the population of firms as compared to the privately optimal industry structure. An explanation of this result is sketched in the next section.
Prices vs quantities
The comparative assessment of the two settings can be carried out along several dimensions, the first being the relative size of 
If instead ∈ ((9 − √ 17)/4, 4/3), we have
and therefore CN > BN . Exactly the same conclusions apply for aggregate industry output and therefore also for the steady state levels of pollution and the natural resource, as the latter are, by the assumptions of the model, linear in the industry output. Hence, we may conclude that, taking ≥ 2 as given (with the exception of the particular and circumscribed case identified in (44)), pollution is lower under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, due to the output restriction observed under price-setting behaviour, which is generated by the presence of decreasing returns to scale. Exactly the opposite would intuitively apply if the marginal cost were constant, as in such a case the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium would coincide with perfect competition and consequently industry output would be higher than the Cournot-Nash one, with obvious consequences on industry profits. However, by the same token, consumer surplus and the steady state volume of natural resource are both higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. A different exercise can be envisaged to compare the two industry output given their respective optimal industry structures CN and BN , to evaluate the difference
whose numerator is positive for all > (and conversely), so that Δ < 0 everywhere.¹⁰ For the aforemen tioned reasons, this has in principle ambiguous consequences on welfare. Hence we must evaluate
In the special case = 0 (i.e., under average cost pricing under Bertrand behaviour), we have: 
with (⋅), (⋅) > 0, so that Δ > 0 for all > (⋅)/ (⋅). Accordingly, we may state: 
Conclusions
We have analysed a differential oligopoly game in which environmental externalities and the exploitation of natural resources combine in a single framework. Considering prices or quantities alternatively as the firms' strategic instruments, we have assessed the privately optimal number of firms against the socially optimal one, showing the emergence of an ambiguous conclusion in the Cournot setup. Conversely, under Bertrand behaviour the privately optimal degree of concentration is definitely too large from the social standpoint. Relatedly, taking as a benchmark the privately optimal industry structure, we have shown that the relative size of welfare levels at the steady states of the two models depends on the capability of the environment to absorb polluting emissions.
The foregoing analysis has been carried out assuming any form of regulation away. The study of the inter play between environmental policy, firms' strategic behaviour and the (in)efficiency of the resulting industry structure in the commons is left for future research.
